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The Rationale for Fundamental Pension Reform
in Germany and the United States:  An Assessment
by
Gary Burtless
Germany and the United States, along with all other major industrial countries, face
the prospect of growing much older over the next five decades.  By 2050, the ratio of people
past age 64 relative to those age 20-64 will exceed 50 percent in every G-7 country except
Canada and the United States.  In Germany, the aged dependency ratio will approach 55
percent.  While the predicted rate will be lower in the United States, the U.S. dependency rate
in 2050 is expected to be 80 percent higher than it is today (see Chart 1).
The cost of providing pensions and medical care for the elderly will place major
strains on government budgets at a time of reduced growth or actual decline in the size of the
labor force.  While aging is an issue of common concern, however, there are important
differences in the magnitude and timing of the demographic changes across countries (see
Chart 2).  The U.S. Census Bureau forecasts significant declines in the populations of
Germany, Italy, and Japan, whereas the U.S. population is predicted to increase more than 40
percent.  The implications for public sector budgets also differ across countries because of
major differences in the structure and generosity of public programs for the elderly.
For most industrialized countries the projected budget cost associated with population
aging is so large that governments will be forced to make major changes in the structure of
programs now providing income and health insurance to the elderly. Policymakers in several
rich countries show interest in following the example of Chile and replacing part or all of their
public pension systems with private systems organized around individual retirement accounts.
Advocates of this kind of reform point to Chile's success in introducing an individual account
system to replace its failing pay-as-you-go system, which the government began to phase out
in the early 1980s.  So far, Chile’s private pension system has received high marks for sound
administration, good returns, and broad political acceptance.  The expected surge in public
retirement costs in rich industrialized countries has made voters and policymakers in these
countries receptive to the idea of a private alternative to existing public systems.2
This paper considers the arguments for fundamental pension reform in Germany and
the United States.  The two countries have recently made or are now considering reforms that
would eventually reduce the generosity of the traditional, pay-as-you-go pension system.
Some of the lost benefits would be replaced by pensions from individual, defined-benefit
accounts.  In May 2001 the German legislature passed a reform plan that will create defined-
contribution pensions for millions of active workers.  Working people will be permitted to
contribute a maximum of 1 percent of their gross earnings to voluntary pension plans
beginning in 2002.  Allowed contributions will be gradually increased to a maximum of 4
percent of gross earnings, and workers' voluntary contributions will be subsidized with
government payments that will be particularly generous in the case of low-wage workers and
workers with child dependents.  At the same time, public pensions under the existing
retirement system will be modestly scaled back for younger and middle-aged workers.  One
goal of the reform is to limit the future contribution rate for the public retirement system --
currently about 19 percent of gross pay -- and replace the lost retirement benefits with
pensions financed out of individual investment accounts.
In May 2001 President George W. Bush appointed a national commission to propose
designs for a new individual retirement account system that would provide supplements to
pensions provided by the existing U.S. social security system.  Like the new German
individual account system, the proposed revision of the existing American system would be
voluntary.  Harsh critics of existing the existing pension system, both in Germany and the
United States, urge an even more drastic overhaul of the system, which they regard as
excessively burdensome on workers and future government budgets.
The discussion in this paper is organized around three questions that go to the heart of
the current controversy over pension reform.
1  Many critics of public pensions believe that the
debate over pension reform revolves around only a single question:  Will a system of capital-
funded individual accounts provide pensions at lower cost than the existing pay-as-you-go
system?  Economists who have studied public pensions recognize that this question is
impossible to answer simply or accurately.  In a fully mature capital-funded system, many
contributors would obtain better pensions at lower cost than they can obtain under the existing
                                                
1  The questions are among those posed by an expert panel on social security privatization established by
the National Academy of Social Insurance, a panel on which I served.  See Diamond (1999), pp. 1-31.3
pay-as-you-go system.  Unfortunately, along the transition path to a fully mature capital-
funded system, many contributors and taxpayers are likely to obtain worse pensions or make
higher tax payments than they can anticipate under the existing system.
This paper addresses three questions that are helpful to thinking about pension reform:
1.  Should rich countries move toward more advance funding of their future pension
obligations, or should they retain a system in which most public pensions are financed on a
pay-as-you-go basis?
2.  If pensions are partially or fully funded, should the pension system diversify its
portfolio to include, for example, equities and foreign holdings, or should it maintain a
conservative strategy of holding only domestic government bonds?
3.  Should national pension systems move toward creation of individual (defined-
contribution) accounts, or should they retain a collective system of shared risk under a
defined-benefit pension system?
Strong proponents of individual retirement accounts believe they already know the
answers to these questions.  Rich countries should move toward more advance funding.  The
reformed pension system should invest in an appropriately broad portfolio of capital market
instruments, including corporate equities.  It should establish individual investment accounts,
and contributors should be given broad discretion to invest their contributions as they please.
Workers should be allowed wide latitude on the form and timing of their withdrawals from
retirement accounts.
Economists and other pension specialists are uncertain whether these answers are the
correct ones.  The advantages of capital funding over pay-as-you-go financing are less
obvious than many people suppose.  The advantages of broad portfolio diversification are
much more persuasive in the case of a private pension fund than they are for a collective
public fund.  If a country adopts a capital-funded system, individual investment accounts have
important disadvantages that must be weighed against their well-known advantages.  Giving
workers complete discretion in the investment and withdrawal of their retirement funds may
allow many of them to reach advanced old age with no assets to finance their retirement
consumption.  The pension system will not have accomplished its main objective, which is to
assure a minimum and reasonably secure income in workers' old age.4
1.  Should we move toward more advance funding?
In a pay-as-you-go public pension system, the benefits paid to current pensioners are
financed with the earmarked contributions of current workers or the tax payments of other
taxpayers.  In this kind of system, it is natural to respond to the budget pressure of an aging
population by scaling back pension benefits or increasing the contribution rate .  These
responses to the system’s financing problem are inherently divisive, because they force
generations and income classes into conflict over which group will have to make the larger
sacrifice in order the maintain the solvency of the system.  If pensions are reduced
immediately, the retired population will make income sacrifices to hold down tax burdens on
current and future workers.  If contribution rates are increased, active workers must make an
income sacrifice to protect the pensions of the retired.
The logic of higher saving.  It is possible to reduce this conflict by increasing the
future national income that will finance the consumption of both future workers and retirees.
To achieve this, the current generation could increase its saving to finance more of its own
retirement.  In neoclassical growth theory, increased saving is one of the few mechanisms that
can boost future aggregate income.  Larger accumulations in the retirement system could raise
the nation’s capital stock or foreign asset holdings and thus increase future national income.
Over the next several decades, a nation with an aging population would still be forced to
spend a rising percentage of its national income on pensions, but it would pay for these
obligations out of a larger economic pie, leaving a bigger slice for future workers.  From the
point of view of pension fund contributors, advance funding is also a way to increase the rate
of return on their contributions.  Part of each worker's retirement benefit would be financed
out of earnings on capital investments, and the rate of return on these investments can easily
exceed the return obtainable in a pay-as-you-go retirement program.
Moving away from pay-as-you-go financing toward advance funded pensions could
provide a mechanism for increasing national saving.  A capital-funded program differs from
pay-as-you-go financing in that it implies a buildup of saving within the pension system and
potentially a larger stock of capital prior to a cohort’s retirement.  As a result of this buildup, a
portion of pensions is financed out of capital income rather than current wage taxes alone.
Furthermore, future workers gain because the larger capital stock boosts their wages, and thus
a given level of benefits can be financed with a lower effective contribution rate.5
Advance funding does not have to occur within private pension funds or individual
investment accounts, of course.  It could also take place within the existing public pension
system.  Nor is advance pension funding necessary to boost a nation’s saving rate.  Countries’
can boost national saving by increasing government surpluses (public saving) or encouraging
greater household or business saving (private saving).  Because future pension spending is
one of the main sources of increased pressure on public budgets, however, it is natural to link
the increase in saving to pension financing, either inside or outside the public sector.
Many American economists, including me, favor a policy of more advance funding of
public (or publicly mandated) pensions.  We believe that advance funding can be achieved in
a way that leads to higher national saving, which must the ultimate goal of any policy that is
aimed at reducing the future burdens of an older population.  If advance funding does not
result in greater aggregate saving, it is hard to think of valid arguments in favor of such a
policy.  Unfortunately, many proposals to move toward advance funding would not
accomplish the goal of increasing national saving.
The success of an advance funding policy in boosting saving depends on the fiscal
behavior of other parts of the public sector and on the response of private saving to the
pension reform.  If the annual surplus of the reformed capital-funded system is simply used to
finance higher spending in the public budget (through pension fund purchases of government
bonds), no net addition to national wealth results from the “funded” system.  Reliance on
advance funding in public pension programs is controversial because many observers doubt
that governments can resist using a large and growing public pension fund surplus to pay for
other public consumption programs.  Moreover, if the move toward more advance funding
causes workers or pensioners to save less in their other private savings accounts, the effect of
advance funding on aggregate saving will be reduced and possibly eliminated.
Well-informed proponents of fundamental pension reform recognize, of course, that
the transition to a more funded system does not automatically produce higher saving.  For
example, if workers are given a rebate of their public pension taxes in order to make deposits
into new pension accounts, the public retirement system will be deprived of revenues that are
needed to pay current pension obligations.  The public pension system would then have a
smaller surplus or a larger deficit, forcing the government to raise taxes, to reduce other
spending, or to borrow extra money.  If the government borrows all the extra money, as some6
advocates of advance funding suggest, the policy could easily reduce national saving.  The
flow of national saving in a given year is the sum of saving that takes place in the private
sector plus saving of the government.  Total government saving is the sum of saving in the
public retirement system plus the surplus or deficit in non-pension government operations.  If
all the public pension surplus were diverted into new funded pension accounts, the
government budget deficit would rise, reducing saving in the government sector and forcing
the government to issue more bonds.
To be sure, the flow of funds into workers’ new pension accounts would increase
saving in the private sector.  If private saving rose by the full amount of extra government
borrowing, national saving (which is the sum of government and private saving) would be
unchanged.  But it is unlikely that private saving would grow by the full amount of extra
government borrowing.  Some workers may already have retirement saving plans connected
to their jobs.  Many of these plans may be almost indistinguishable from the new voluntary or
compulsory retirement accounts that would be established if a new funded system were
established.  At least a few workers or firms would reduce their contributions to existing
occupational pension plans if they were forced or allowed to save in new government-
mandated accounts.  Any reduction in the flow of saving into old retirement accounts would
offset part of the effect of the flow of saving into the new retirement accounts.  Private saving
would then climb by less than the extra government borrowing.
In order to boost national saving, a privatization plan must reduce someone’s
consumption.  The plan could reduce the public pension benefits -- and thus the consumption
-- of people who are already retired or who will soon retire.  Alternatively, it could increase
the combined contributions that workers make to the old pension system and new funded
pension accounts and thereby reduce their consumption.  For example, if benefit payments
were cut $10 billion, the public pension surplus would be $10 billion larger and the
government deficit $10 billion smaller.  National saving would then be $10 billion higher.
Alternatively, if workers were required to contribute an additional $10 billion of their pay to
the old public pension system and new retirement accounts, the revenue flowing into the
public pension fund and the new retirement accounts would be $10 billion larger.  This policy,
too, would raise national saving.7
Some plans to increase pension funding have a good chance of boosting aggregate
saving.  Plans with the best chance of success would follow one or both of the following
strategies: (a) Increase the combination of  payroll taxes for the existing pension system and
mandated or voluntary contributions into new pension accounts; or (b) Cut benefits to current
pensioners or workers who will retire in the next few years without lowering contributions to
the system.
The case for advance funding in Germany and the United States.  Assuming that a
policy of advance funding is desirable, is the case for funding more compelling in Germany or
the United States?  Germany faces a more dramatic change in its population age structure than
the United States, and for that reason pension reform is a more urgent policy concern than it is
in the United States (see Charts 1 and 2).   Germany also provides more generous public
pensions than the United States.  On an after-tax income basis, the public pension of an
average-wage German worker replaces about 63 percent of the pre-retirement wage.  The
comparable replacement rate in the United States is only 50 percent.  The combination of an
older population and a more generous pension formula means that Germany must devote
more of its national income to pensions.  German public pensions consume a share of GDP
that is more than twice as high as it is in the United States -- 11.1 percent of GDP in Germany
versus 5.1 percent of GDP in the United States.
2
German public pensions are not only unfunded, they also require large annual transfers
from the general government budget.  In contrast, the U.S. social security system has
accumulated reserves equal to 12 percent of GDP.   The growing annual surpluses of the
social security system account for much of the improvement in U.S. public sector finances
over the past decade.  According to the latest forecast of the U.S. Social Security
Administration, the reserves of the system will reach a peak equal to 23 percent of GDP in
2017.  Thus, in comparison with public pensions in Germany, U.S. public pensions are
already partially funded.
Chart 3 summarizes the most recent forecast of the future financial operations of the
U.S. public pension system.  The dark horizontal line shows the annual income of the social
security system, excluding interest payments, measured as a percentage of taxable earnings.
Since virtually all social security income, except interest, is derived from payroll taxes, the
                                                
2  These estimates refer to 1995.  See Bosworth and Burtless (1998), pp. 8-9.8
income of the system is slightly more than 12.4 percent of taxable wages, the combined
payroll tax imposed on workers and employers.
3   The lighter curved line shows total social
security receipts, including interest payments on social security reserves.  Interest payments
now represent 12 percent of total social security revenues, and they are expected to reach 22
percent of revenues by 2015.   The chart also shows social security benefit payments and
administrative costs, measured as a percentage of taxable wages.  If the U.S. social security
system were a strictly pay-as-you-go system, this line would represent the payroll tax rate
needed to keep the program solvent.  However, tax and interest revenues are currently
substantially higher than benefit payments, so the program has large annual surpluses (bottom
line in Chart 3).  By 2015 the retirement of the baby boom generation will cause benefit
payments to exceed payroll and income tax revenues, and by 2025 benefit payments will
exceed the combined income from taxes and interest earnings.  The reserve fund will then
begin to decline, and it will be exhausted in 2038 unless the benefit formula is changed or the
contribution rate is increased.  If the U.S. public pension system is to remain solvent after
2038, the payroll tax rate must be increased in that year by 4.6 percentage points (to 17
percent) or benefits will have to be cut about 25 percent.
Although the long-term outlook for U.S. public pensions is poor, the outlook for the
German pension system is much worse.  The German contribution rate is already 19.5 percent
of wages, more than 7 percentage points higher than the comparable rate in the United States
and higher than the U.S. tax rate that will be needed after the American baby boom generation
has retired.   Even a 19.5-percent contribution rate is not high enough to pay for current
German pensions, however.  The IMF estimates that about one-quarter of German public
pensions are financed by a transfer from general government funds.  Unless these transfers
rise or benefits are cut, the IMF predicts that the required contribution rate in the German
system will increase to 23 percent by 2020 and to 30 percent by 2040 (IMF, 2000, pp. 87-90).
In comparison, the required payroll tax rate in the U.S. system in 2040 is just 17 percent (see
Chart 3).
The contrast between Germany and the United States is even more striking once we
take account of occupational pensions in the two countries.  Slightly more than one-half of all
                                                
3  The system also derives income from the federal income tax imposed on social security pensions.  Since
these income taxes are predicted to rise in the future, the total income of the system, including payroll and9
active workers in the United States (including a large majority of workers with above-average
wages) are covered by an employer-sponsored -- or “occupational” -- pension scheme.
4  By
law, employer-sponsored plans are fully funded.  In addition, many workers make voluntary
contributions to Keogh plans (for the self-employed), 401(k) or 403(b) plans (for private
company and nonprofit institution employees), or Individual Retirement Accounts (primarily
for employees not covered by an employer pension plan).  These schemes are by definition
fully funded pensions.  According to estimates of the World Bank, the assets of occupational
pension plans were equal to almost 60 percent of U.S. national income in 1996 (see Chart 4).
Germany has a much smaller occupational pension system.  Deutsche Bank estimates that the
total assets of company pension plans represented 15 percent of German GDP in 1996, but
about half of these assets were held as book reserves on company balance sheets (IMF, 2000,
p. 83).  Thus, the combined assets of the public and private pension systems in the United
States are many times larger than they are in Germany.  Comparing the balance sheets of
public and private pension plans and the future pressures of an aging population, the case for
moving toward advance funding of pensions seems much more compelling in Germany than
the United States.
It is not obvious, however, whether the higher level of funding of pension obligations
in the United States has led to increased national saving.   Chart 5 shows gross domestic
saving rates in the G-7 countries, measured as a percentage of GDP.   The United Kingdom,
the United States, and Canada, which have the highest levels of advance funding among the
G-7 countries, also have the lowest rates of gross saving.
5  What is more, the rate of net
private U.S. saving has declined significantly during the past 15 years, in spite of the rapid
accumulation of assets in pension funds (see top panel of Chart 6).  Pension saving in
occupational pension funds is included in household saving.  As a fraction of U.S. GDP, net
household saving fell from an average of 7.3 percent during the twenty-five years after 1960
to just 2.5 percent between 1996 and 2000.  Even as private pension funds were accumulating
substantial amounts of assets, other components of household saving fell.
                                                                                                                                                        
income tax payments, will rise slowly in comparison with the taxable wage base.
4  Among working American families where the head of household is less than 65 years old, 57 percent of
families have at least one member who participates in an occupational pension plan (EBRI, 2000).
5 See Disney (2000) Table 3, for statistics on the funding status of pensions in the industrialized countries.10
The accumulation of funds in the social security reserve has helped to offset the large
drop in U.S. private saving. The growing social security surpluses have contributed to a recent
surge in government saving, helping to reverse a long-term trend toward lower overall saving
rates (see the bottom panel of Chart 6).  Nonetheless, net saving in the United States remains
far below average levels in earlier decades and significantly below the rates in other
industrialized countries, including Germany.  Net U.S. investment has remained strong only
because of a large swing in foreign investment flows.  Foreign savers are now investing much
more in the United States than Americans are investing abroad, reversing the pattern of cross-
border saving flows that characterized the first decades after World War II.  Even though U.S.
investment remains reasonably robust, an increasing share of the income flow from U.S.
investment will be earned by foreign savers rather than Americans.
The low net saving rate of Americans relative to Germans suggests that it is the United
States, rather than Germany, that is in greater need of a policy to spur additional saving.
Unfortunately, the cross-national evidence does not offer any persuasive evidence that
advance pension funding will automatically provide a stimulus to higher private or aggregate
national saving.  Mackensie et al. (1997) find no clear association between the size and degree
of funding of occupational schemes, on the one hand, and the level of national saving, on the
other (see also IMF, 2000, p. 86).  Thus, even though the case for higher national saving may
be more persuasive for the United States than it is for Germany, it is not clear that faster
accumulation of funds in private pension accounts will actually spur higher private or
aggregate saving.  On balance, the U.S. evidence suggests that faster accumulation of funds in
the public pension system is more likely to result in higher aggregate saving through its effect
on government saving.
2.  Should the pension fund accumulation be held in a diversified portfolio?
Assuming that a nation chooses to move toward greater advance funding of pensions,
it must still decide how to hold the savings that will pay for future pensions.   (If a country
continues to pay for pensions with a pay-as-you-go mechanism, the choice of how to hold
pension system assets is not very important.   No matter which investment strategy is selected,
the reserves of the system will be small and the effects of alternative investment strategies
trivial.)   One way to resolve the question about appropriate investment strategy is to leave the
choice of investments to individual workers.  In an individual retirement account system11
where workers are offered wide latitude in selecting investments for their retirement savings
accounts, the choice of investment strategy is not made by public officials but by individual
workers.  In this system, the appropriate investment strategy is not made just once but is made
at many points in time by millions of workers.
As noted above, advance funding can be accomplished outside of individual
retirement accounts, however.  The government could continue to provide defined-benefit
pensions, financed in part out of current tax contributions and in part out of the investment
earnings of a large and growing reserve fund.  In this case, policymakers must decide how the
growing reserves of the system will be invested.  As the reserves of the fund grow, the
investment decisions of the fund managers become more important.  If the U.S. social security
system were a fully funded pension program, it would require assets equal to somewhat more
than U.S. GDP in order to pay off the future pension claims that have been accumulated so
far.  As the American population grows older, the discounted value of future pension claims
will increase relative to national income.  For purposes of comparison, the national wealth of
the United States in 1995 was about 2.8 times GDP.  Thus, future public pension claims are
equal to roughly one-third of U.S. national wealth.  If these claims were fully funded, the
public pension system would hold a large share of national wealth.  The investment choices of
the fund managers could then have an enormous influence on the economy.
The best investment strategy for individual workers is not necessarily the best strategy
for public pension fund managers.  An individual worker should select a portfolio of
marketable securities and other saving instruments to provide him with the highest expected
return consistent with his tolerance for risk.  In the United States, corporate stocks and bonds
have a higher expected return than U.S. Treasury bonds because they are riskier.  The higher
return on private equities and bonds compensates investors for differences in the risk they
assume when buying these securities relative to the risk they accept when buying Treasury
bonds.  Almost all American private pension managers and individual workers who are
offered a broad menu of investment options choose to invest a large majority of pension
savings in riskier assets, such as stocks and corporate bonds (Engen and Lehnert, 2000, p.
805).  They are willing to accept a higher level of risk in exchange for a higher expected
return.12
Political issues.  It is not obvious that public pension managers should adopt the same
strategy for investing pension reserves as individual workers adopt when they invest their own
pension savings.   The public managers could certainly obtain a higher expected return with
tolerable risk if they invested pension reserves in a broadly diversified portfolio consisting of
government and company bonds, corporate equities, mortgage debt, and real estate.  In fact,
such an investment strategy would reduce the pension fund’s exposure to risk compared with
a strategy of investing all holdings in government bonds.
Investing in corporate equities and bonds or in the corporate stock of foreign
companies requires that government fund managers make choices about which companies and
industries to invest in.  Even if the government adopted a passive investment strategy and
invested broadly across a large number of private securities (for example, proportional
holdings of all publicly traded companies in the United States), the policy of investing in
private securities would force the government to make difficult decisions about how to
exercise the right to vote in corporate elections.  Many Americans, including the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve, are very uneasy about granting to government officials this kind of
influence over the allocation of investment funds and the management decisions of private
companies.   They are skeptical that elected politicians could refrain from interfering in
investment and business decisions.   Critics of government stock ownership believe elected
officials would be under heavy pressure to direct investment toward favored industries and to
cast votes in corporate elections to obtain politically popular goals.  If legislators bowed to
these pressures, investment might be allocated in a suboptimal way and businesses might be
forced to operate less efficiently than would be the case if the public pension fund did not
hold corporate stock.
These objections to government investment in private companies seem less important
in Germany, where there is a long tradition of public ownership of private company stock.
However, they may be decisive in the United States, where government ownership of private
companies arouses fierce opposition.
6
Aggregate effects.  Most economists who favor advance funding support the policy
because they hope it will produce higher aggregate saving.  Almost all of the economic13
benefits from higher saving will occur whether or not the pension fund holds corporate
equities or foreign assets.   Whether the pension fund surpluses add to aggregate investment,
and hence to future economic growth, depends mainly on whether they add to national saving,
not on the particular assets in which they are invested.  U.S. social security reserves are now
invested entirely in U.S. Treasury securities, where they earn a modest but low-risk return.  If
the social security portfolio were broadened to include corporate bonds and equities, the
expected return of the reserve would increase.  Investment earnings of the Trust Fund would
rise, and the need for future tax hikes or benefit cuts would shrink.  The effects of the
portfolio shift on the wider economy would be very modest, however.  If the Trust Fund sold
$1 billion in Treasury Bonds to purchase $1 billion dollars in corporate equities, some private
investors would hold an extra $1 billion in Treasury Bonds and $1 billion less in corporate
equities.  For the aggregate economy, the main effect of the portfolio shift is the change in
ownership of particular securities, which does not materially change the level or composition
of U.S. output or  investment.  Hence, the shift in ownership has little effect on U.S. economic
growth.
7
Even though the most important economic benefits of advance funding do not depend
on whether pension reserves are invested in stocks or government bonds, investing the
reserves in a balanced portfolio can increase their expected return with a manageable level of
risk.  If the reserve fund earns a higher rate of return, workers can contribute less to the fund
and still receive the same promised benefit.  Even though the aggregate benefit of a broad
investment strategy is dubious, the gain for tax payers and workers should be obvious:  They
will not have to contribute as much to keep the pension system solvent.   Note, however, that
this gain to workers and tax payers can only occur if the reserve of the pension system
becomes large in relation to future pension claims.  If the reserve remains small, then it does
                                                                                                                                                        
6  This opposition is ironic, because federal, state and local government officials already appoint the
trustees of public employee pension plans.  Nearly all public employee pension plans, including the one for
Federal Reserve Board employees, own bonds and equities of private corporations.
7  If private investors wish to hold a riskier portfolio than the one they initially hold after the social security
Trust Fund sells Treasury bonds and buys corporate equities, the interest rate on Treasury bonds might rise
slightly and private investors might compensate for their larger Treasury holdings by purchasing other risky
assets, including, for example, small company or foreign company stock.  In the long run, large-scale
government purchases of one particular class of marketable security can have important effects on the market
value and relative return of that asset class.  These effects are small in comparison to those of an advance
funding policy that significantly increases the aggregate saving rate.14
not matter whether the return on pension assets is high or low.  A 20-percent annual return on
investments is no better than a 1-percent return if assets held by the pension fund are
negligible.
Assuming that public pension policy is changed so that the reserve becomes large, an
advantage of the broad diversification strategy is that workers who have few financial assets
get to share in the higher expected returns on riskier investments.  If a large percentage of
workers is prevented by borrowing constraints from investing in high-expected-return assets,
then investing part of the pension reserve in high-risk / high-return assets will allow these
workers to enjoy the favorable returns they earn.  This argument may be stronger in Germany,
where comparatively few households hold financial assets with above-average risk and high
expected returns and where the cost of buying and holding such assets is high.  Even in the
United States, however, many young workers and low-wage workers do not participate in the
equity and corporate bond markets, probably because of borrowing constraints.
3.  Should the pension system shift to defined-contribution individual accounts?
A retirement system based on individual accounts would look very different from the
present public pension system in both Germany and the United States.  Instead of contributing
to state-sponsored social security, workers would be required to build up retirement savings in
individually owned and directed private accounts.  Workers would be free to decide how their
contributions are invested, at least within broad limits.  They would withdraw funds from
their accounts when they became disabled or reached the retirement age.  To ensure that
retired workers do not out-live their retirement savings, some or all of the funds in workers’
accounts could be converted on a mandatory basis into annuities when workers retire.
Individual defined-contribution accounts differ from traditional public pensions in an
important way.  The worker’s ultimate retirement benefit would depend solely on the size of
the worker’s contributions and the success of the worker’s investment plan.  Workers who
make larger contributions receive bigger pensions, other things equal.  Workers whose
investments earn high returns collect larger annuities than workers who invest poorly.
Advantages.  There are three principal advantages of an individual account system
compared with a traditional defined-benefit system.  Only one of these advantages is strictly
economic.  The other two represent political advantages, although these political advantages
may have important economic consequences.  The only economic advantage of an individual15
account system relative to a defined-benefit system is that workers are allowed to choose their
own investment strategy for retirement savings.  Workers who prefer to accept greater risk in
exchange for higher expected returns are permitted to select an investment strategy that
reflects this preference.  Workers who are less tolerant of risk and willing to accept lower
expected returns can choose an investment portfolio based on this preference.  In a collective
retirement system that pays for all workers’ benefits out of the same investment fund, workers
must accept the risk-return characteristics of the portfolio selected by pension fund managers.
Workers with a high tolerance for risk are likely to find that returns in the collective system
are unacceptably low.  Workers with a low tolerance for risk would accept a somewhat
smaller expected pension in exchange for reduced exposure to financial market risk.
Of course, workers who have savings in addition to their pension fund accumulation
can partly or fully offset the investment choices of the pension fund manager by choosing a
more or less risky strategy when investing their nonpension assets.  As noted earlier, however,
many workers, especially low-income and young workers, have few financial assets of their
own.  They must accept the portfolio choices of the pension fund manager, regardless of their
own attitudes toward financial market and expected returns.  The principal economic
advantage of an individual account system is that it allows workers to follow their own
investment preferences.
One political advantage of an individual account system is that government officials
do not have to decide how to invest the assets accumulated in the pension fund.  If retirement
savings are invested in corporate equities, public officials do not have to decide how to vote in
corporate elections.  These decisions can be left to millions of individual workers when they
choose how to invest their retirement savings.  Even though government officials would not
be directly involved in these decisions in an individual account system, they might still play
an important indirect role through their regulatory power over private pension funds and
workers’ investment choices.  Nonetheless, the influence of public policymakers over
retirement investment decisions in an individual account system is considerably smaller than
it would be under a collective, defined-benefit system.  This political advantage is much less
important in Germany than it is in the United States, where there is deep skepticism about the
regulatory instincts of political officials.16
A second advantage of individual accounts is that the funds accumulated in such
accounts are difficult for legislators to use to pay for nonpension public spending.  In contrast,
it is straightforward for legislators to use growing surpluses in a public pension system to
cover growing deficits in nonpension government programs.  Many critics of the U.S. social
security surpluses in the late 1980s claimed that these surpluses were being used by Congress
and the President to obscure the true size of the government deficit.  Congress and the
President acted as though the surplus of payroll tax revenue over pension benefits was
available for spending on other public services, such as national defense and health care.
(This criticism seems less plausible today, when the surpluses in social security account for an
overwhelming percentage of net government saving.)  If the pension surpluses had instead
been accumulated in millions of individual retirement accounts, the federal government would
have found it more difficult -- though not impossible -- to spend them on nonpension
programs or imprudent tax reductions.  This political advantage may be crucial if the move to
advance funding is to produce an increase in national saving.  If the government moves
toward advance funding of pensions, but then spends the pension surpluses on current
operations, no change in national saving will occur.
Disadvantages of individual accounts.  Along with the economic and political
advantages of individual accounts policymakers must consider some important disadvantages.
Just as the accumulation of additional funding in a public pension program can encourage
legislators to increase nonpension deficits, the accumulation of additional funding in private
investment accounts can induce workers to reduce other forms of household saving.  If the
new funded pensions are very similar to existing occupational pensions, the extra funds
accumulated in new accounts may be partly or fully offset by reduced saving in the old
pension schemes.  This consideration is much more important in the United States than it is in
Germany, because many more Americans are already covered by a fully funded occupational
pension scheme.  On the other hand, household saving is considerably higher in Germany
than it is in the United States, so there is much greater scope for reductions in German private
saving.  Of course, many workers do not participate in voluntary pension schemes and do not
have much financial wealth.  These workers do not have much room to offset compulsory
contributions to a new funded pension system through reductions in other forms of household17
saving.  If they are enrolled in a new compulsory retirement saving plan, they will be forced
to reduce current consumption, thus boosting aggregate saving.
The major disadvantages of an individual account system are economic.  One
disadvantage is that the administrative burden of an individual account system is substantially
higher than the cost of managing a single retirement fund.   If workers are offered a large
number of investment options, it can be costly to collect contributions and allocate them to the
appropriate investment fund.  Even if the number of investment choices is limited,
competition among private fund managers does not necessarily lead to low administrative
costs.  It can lead, as it has in Chile, to costly sales campaigns that attempt to differentiate
fund companies through advertising and extraneous services rather than through differences in
funds’ net rates of return.
The cost disadvantage of an individual account system may be even greater at the
stage when pension accumulations are converted into annuities.  Under a collective pension
plan, all workers’ contributions can be converted into compulsory and fair annuities at the
point of retirement.  This is much more difficult and costly for a private retirement fund, since
each private fund must be concerned about the possibility of adverse selection among the
workers who have elected to invest pension savings and purchase annuities from the fund.
This problem may lead many pension funds to impose heavy charges when savings are
converted into an annuity, greatly reducing the rate of return workers can obtain on their
retirement savings.  Of course, these problems and others can be handled through sensible
regulation.  But supervision of private investment managers and annuity companies is costly,
and, as the experience of Great Britain suggests, regulation itself is fraught with error.
8
Probably the most important shortcoming of an individual account system is that it
virtually eliminates the risk pooling across workers and generations that is inherent in a
collective retirement system.  Because the connection between individual contributions,
investment returns, and pension benefits is very straightforward in a defined-contribution
pension program, such a system offers less scope to insure workers against poor investment
                                                
8  The United Kingdom established a system in which workers could opt out of the state-provided earnings-
related pension system if they found a private pension provider which offered benefits meeting government
minimum requirements.  Many workers were persuaded by private providers to opt out of the state-provided
scheme, even though the benefits provided by the private alternative were less generous than those obtainable
under the state-provided scheme.18
returns.  Workers who make foolish investment decisions or who have the misfortune to
invest when financial market returns are low can end up with extremely small pensions.  To
duplicate the traditional pension system’s success in keeping down poverty among the elderly,
a private system would have to supplement the pensions from individual retirement accounts
with a minimum, tax-financed pension or with public assistance payments.
When contributions are invested prudently, defined-contribution retirement accounts
ordinarily provide good pensions, at least in the United States.  Assume, for example, that
workers can purchase fair annuities and earn the historical U.S. stock market return on their
pension contributions.  Under these assumptions American workers who contribute 6 percent
of their pay to a defined-contribution plan over a 40-year career can anticipate receiving an
initial pension that replaces 50 percent to 60 percent of their peak annual earnings.  This
pension compares favorably with the initial pension received by average workers under the
U.S. social security system.  American workers who earn average U.S. wages collect social
security pensions that are between 34 percent and 43 percent of pre-retirement earnings,
depending on the age when benefits are first claimed.  If a worker has a dependent spouse
who never worked, the social security pension would range between 51 percent and 65
percent of the pre-retirement earnings of an average-wage worker.
9
A defined-contribution system allocates risks in a very different way than the
traditional, defined-benefit system, however.  Under the German and U.S. systems, workers
born in the same year who have similar earnings records are assured similar retirement
benefits.   Because of political constraints on democratically elected legislators, the benefit
formula changes very slowly and only after protracted political debate.  Since this debate
involves both contributors and beneficiaries, changes in contribution and benefit formulas
tend to reflect a compromise between the interests of the two groups.  The adverse effects of
unanticipated demographic, labor market, and financial market developments are rarely if
ever borne by a single cohort.  They are spread across a number of cohorts through gradual
changes in contribution rates and benefit levels.  In contrast, workers participating in a
defined-contribution system bear much more of the risk associated with financial market
fluctuations.  Workers who invest wisely and redeem their retirement savings when asset
                                                
9  The after-tax replacement rates for average-wage workers are somewhat higher than this, because social
security benefits are more lightly taxed than wages.19
prices are high will enjoy comfortable retirements.  Workers who invest foolishly or redeem
their savings when asset prices are low will collect small pensions.
I have analyzed these risks for U.S. workers by considering the hypothetical returns
workers would have obtained between 1911 and 2000 if they had accumulated retirement
savings in individual accounts (Burtless, 2000a and 2000b).  The 90 hypothetical contributors
are assumed to have identical careers and to contribute a fixed percentage of their wages to
private investment accounts.  When contributors reach retirement age, they convert their
retirement savings into level annuities.  To make the calculations comparable across time, all
contributors are assumed to have an identical career path of earnings and to face the same
mortality risks after retirement.  Contributors differ only with respect to the stock market
returns, bond interest rates, and price inflation they face over their careers.  These differences
occur because of the differing start and end dates of the workers’ careers.
Chart 7 shows real U.S. stock market returns over the past century.  Because stock
market prices fluctuate so much from year to year, the chart shows the annual rate of return on
a dollar invested in the stock market 15 years before the indicated year.  This method of
calculation averages out much of the annual variability in real returns, but it still reveals the
wide variability of returns over different 15-year periods.  The 15-year trailing return was
negative in 1920 and 1980, but it exceeded 12 percent in the mid-1930s, 1960s, and late
1990s.
One way to summarize a worker’s success in saving for retirement is to calculate the
real internal rate of return on his contributions.  Chart 8 shows the time series pattern of
internal rates of return for workers retiring between 1911 and 2000.  I assume that workers
have the standard age-earnings profile observed for American men and that economy-wide
average wages rise by 2 percent per year over the worker’s 40-year career.  Worker’s invest a
constant percentage of their wages in a pension fund.  The returns shown in the chart indicate
the internal rate of real return that a worker has obtained at the end of his 40-year career.  The
top line in the chart shows the returns workers would have obtained if they invested all their
contributions in the U.S. stock market.  The average real return on contributions, measured at
the point of a worker’s retirement, is 6.3 percent.  Real stock market returns have been
somewhat higher in recent years.  If we exclude careers that began before 1924 (that is,
retirements that occurred before 1964), the average real return on contributions in a U.S.20
stock-market pension fund was 6.7 percent.  The range of returns is surprisingly wide,
however.  The lowest return, attained by a worker retiring after the U.S. stock market collapse
after World War I, was just 1.5 percent, more than 4½ points below the long-term historical
average.  The highest return, almost 10 percent, was achieved by workers retiring in the mid-
1960s.  These workers had the happy experience of accumulating stocks during lengthy
periods when stock market prices were depressed and converting their retirement savings into
annuities when stock prices were exceptionally high.  Workers retiring in the late 1990s
enjoyed similar good fortune.
The fluctuations in realized returns, even over short periods, are startling.  Between
1921 and 1929 the internal rate of return on contributions rose from 1.5 percent to 8.4 percent,
and the real return then plunged to 4.1 percent in 1933.  The return fell from 8.5 percent in
1973 to 5.0 percent in 1975 and to 3.6 percent in 1982 before recovering to 9.3 percent in
1999.  While it is certainly true that U.S. common stocks offer exceptionally good returns
compared with alternative investments, it is also true that no American worker can be
confident of achieving the historical average return over an investment career that spans just
40 years.  Chart 8 shows realized returns for 90 workers.  Among these workers, 57 percent
achieved a real return that was below the 6.3 percent historical average, and more than 10
percent achieved a return that was less than two-thirds of the historical average.
Workers can follow a couple strategies to reduce the riskiness of their pensions.  One
is to invest a portion of their retirement savings in bonds rather than stocks, diversifying their
investment portfolio.  This strategy reduces the volatility of the worker’s replacement rate, but
it also sharply reduces the expected value of the annuity. The historical real return on low-risk
U.S. bonds has been about 5 percentage points below the equivalent return on U.S. common
stocks.  The lower lines in Chart 8 show the real returns U.S. workers would have obtained if
they invested some or all of their pension savings in bonds rather than stocks.  Workers who
invested all of their pension accumulation in U.S. Treasury bonds would have obtained a real
return that averages 5.8 percent below the return they would have obtained if they invested all
their savings in U.S. equities.  Note that the real return on U.S. government bonds has
historically been less than the return that workers can expect under the present social security
system, even if benefits are scaled back to keep the program solvent.21
This analysis suggests that the financial market risks of a private retirement system are
empirically quite large.  The risks are of two kinds.  Two workers who have the same career
earnings and who retire in the same year can obtain widely different pensions depending on
the investment strategy they follow.  The results in Chart 8 show that workers who invested in
U.S. stocks would have received much better returns during the twentieth century than
workers who invested in government bonds.  Workers also face a substantial risk that they
will retire when asset prices are low.  Rates of return are quite uncertain, and differ widely for
workers who end their careers in different years, even if the workers followed an identical
investment strategy when investing their retirement savings.
Although some of these risks are also present in a public retirement system, a public
system has one important advantage over private pensions.  A public retirement system is
backed by the taxing and borrowing authority of the state.  It can therefore spread risks over a
much larger population of potential contributors and beneficiaries.  This makes the risks more
manageable for active and retired workers, many of whom have little ability to insure
themselves privately against financial market risk.
While it would be interesting to compare financial market risks in Germany with those
in the United States, that exercise will not be undertaken here.  Americans' investment
portfolios suggest they have a higher tolerance for risk than Germans.  Gross personal
financial wealth is more likely to be held in the form of pension assets and equities in the
United States, whereas household financial wealth in Germany is much more likely to be held
as currency and bank deposits (see Chart 9).  Note also that a large percentage of U.S. pension
assets are invested in corporate equities.  This difference between German and American
tastes for financial market risk suggests that Americans would be more willing to tolerate the
risk associated with individual retirement accounts which are invested in equities.  The
difference in tastes is reflected in the pension systems of the two countries.  The U.S. system
contains a smaller defined-benefit collective pension, in which risks are broadly shared across
the population, and a larger defined-contribution individual pension, in which financial
market risks are borne by individual workers.  On average, American workers derive an
important advantage from their system, because along with higher risk they also earn higher
average returns on their pension contributions.  Unfortunately, the less generous public
pension also means that a much higher percentage of America’s elderly have disposable22
incomes that fall below 50 percent of the nation’s median income.  Chart 10 shows that the
poverty rate of the U.S. aged population is three times the rate among West Germans who are
65 years old and older (Smeeding, Burtless, and Rainwater, 2001).  Although much of the
difference between U.S. and German poverty rates is due to differences in the nature of the
two countries' retirement systems, some of the difference would also be present if both
countries had an identical system.  Wages are more unequally distributed in the United States
than in Germany, so retirement incomes would also be more unequally distributed, even if the
United States and Germany shared the same pension system.  Nonetheless, the important
difference between the two countries' pension systems tends to boost the relative poverty rate
of the United States.
The Outlook for Public Pension Reform
Germany and the United States will have to support their retired workers out of the
national incomes available when future generations reach retirement age.  Whether retirees
receive most of their income from public pensions, as they do today, or from private pensions,
as they would under a system of individual accounts, their consumption will be derived from
the output of future workers and the future capital stock.  If productivity grows rapidly, the
elderly can be generously supported and active workers can enjoy steady increases in their
after-tax incomes. This is true whether old-age pensions are provided under the existing
public pension program or under a system of private investment accounts.  If productivity
grows slowly, future workers will have to accept lower after-tax incomes and retirees will
have to accept smaller pensions unless workers can be persuaded to delay their retirement.
The implications of slow growth will be the same whether pension incomes are derived from
a public or private system23
Moving the retirement system toward advance funding of future pension obligations
can help increase productivity and future national income, but only if it results in higher
national saving.  Advance funding can be achieved by reforming the existing public, defined-
benefit system or by introducing individual, defined-contribution pension accounts.  In either
case, higher saving will require a consumption sacrifice in the short run.  This is true whether
pension reserves are invested in a broad portfolio of financial assets or held as government
bonds.  The economic advantage of an individual account system is that contributors to the
pension system have the opportunity to choose the investment portfolio that most closely
matches their taste for risk and expected reward.  The political advantage is that it reduces the
scope for political interference in investment selection and company decision-making.  The
offsetting disadvantages are that such a system is more costly to manage, thus reducing
workers’ ultimate pensions, and fails to spread financial market risk broadly across workers
and generations.
All workers would welcome the opportunity to earn better returns on their
contributions to the retirement system.  Individual defined-contribution accounts can provide
better returns than the existing pension systems of both Germany and the United States, but
they would expose workers to a substantial hazard that their pensions would be too small to
finance a comfortable retirement.  The most often cited benefit of private retirement systems
is that they can provide better returns to covered workers.  If public systems were reformed to
include advance funding and prudent investment of reserves, they could provide the same
expected return to workers with far less financial market risk.
The choice between the public and private reform alternatives depends ultimately on
political rather than economic considerations, because the economic advantages of neither
system are decisive (Burtless and Bosworth, 1997).  Advocates of privatization are skeptical
that elected officials can be trusted to manage the accumulation of a big retirement fund.
They fear that larger public pension surpluses would be spent on other government
consumption (and hence not saved) or that fund accumulation will be invested unwisely.
Opponents of privatization believe that scaling back the public program so that it provides
only modest, poverty-level benefits will cause the public component to be viewed as a public
assistance program.  This could undermine the political popularity of the program and
possibly threaten the continuation of redistribution to the low-income elderly.  A public plan24
offers stronger assurances to low-wage workers, but a private plan is more appealing to
workers who want a better return on their contributions.
Germany has already begun moving toward a retirement system in which a large
fraction of the workforce will contribute to individual pension accounts on a voluntary basis.
The most recent German reform will modestly scale back benefits in the traditional, pay-as-
you-go retirement program.  Even when the reform is fully implemented, however, Germany's
public pension program will remain much more generous and costly than the equivalent
system in the United States.  It remains to be seen whether additional reform will be needed to
shrink the German public system still further.  Pension reform has not advanced as far in the
United States as in Germany, in part because the U.S. has a more affordable public retirement
system and much more extensive and generous private pensions.  While the United States has
less need for reform than Germany, its voters have a greater tolerance for financial market
risk and a stronger aversion to high taxes.  In the long run, these preferences could be crucial
in determining the ultimate course of pension reform.25
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Note:  Aged dependency rate is the ratio of persons 65 years and older to persons 20-64 years       Source:  U.S. Census Bureau.
Chart 2.  Population Trends in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 
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Chart 6.  Components of Net U.S. Saving, 1961-2000
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nChart 8.  Real Rate of Return under Alternative 
Investment Strategies after 40 Years of Investing 








1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000






























































































Source:  U.S. Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan.Chart 10.  Poverty Rates among the 
















% of elderly population that is poor
Source: Smeeding, Rainwater, and Burtless (2001).